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Abstract
In this paper, we present a model of Partnership Game with respect
to the important role of partnership and cooperation in nowdays life.
Since such interactions are repeated frequently, we study this model
as a Stage Game in the structure of infinitely repeated games with a
discount factor δ and Trigger strategy. We calculate and compare the
payoffs of cooperation and violation and as an important result of this
study, we show that each partner will adhere to the cooperation.
Keywords: game theory, Partnership Game, repeated game, Trigger
strategy
JLE classification:C71, C73
1 Introduction
Since game theory examines situations in which decision-makers interact,
this theory has many applications such as firms competing for business,
political candidates competing for votes, bidders competing in an auction,
animals fighting over prey, the arms race between countries, the relation-
ship between parents and children, using the resources in nature,etc (see
[2],[3],[4],[7],[12],[13] and [14]).
On the other hand, many of the strategic interactions in which we are in-
volved are repeated interactions with the same people. The relationship
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between the worker and the employer is an example of this type. We can
use the theory of repeated games to study such behaviors. The main idea in
this theory is that a player may be deterred from exploiting her short-term
advantage by the threat of punishment that reduces her long-term payoff.
In repeated games with perfect information that each player can observe the
strategy used by other players, considering the discount factor δ, it is possi-
ble that Nash equilibria of the repeated game (supergame) is more efficient
than the Nash equilibria of the Stage Game, or one- period game. One of the
important examples in this area is Cournots oligopoly game, which has been
examined as an infinitely repeated game with discount factor δ (see[1],[5],[17]
and [18]).
There are many activities and projects in which people contribute and
the payoffs of those activities are derived from the efforts of each of the
partners. Clearly, if any of the partners makes more efforts, more success
will be achieved in these activities. But since more efforts by one person
are beneficial to other people, they may not have the motivation to work
effectively on these projects. In fact, everyone chooses to make less effort
and others to do more. With this view, another class of repeated games with
imperfect information has examined models as Partnership Games with and
without the discount factor.[6],[8],[9],[10],[15],[16].
By getting the idea of Partnership Game in [11] and [16], we have pre-
sented a more complete model of participation and considering the role of
collaboration in nowdays life and the fact that a collaborative activity can
be repeated frequently, we study the proposed model as a Stage Game in
the structure of infinitely repeated games with perfect information and the
discount factor δ between 0 and 1. The results of this research encourage
individuals to adhere to collaboration and cooperation, which is one of the
most important goals of a social and modern life.
2 Model formulation and basic properties
As a Complete Information Game, we assume that there is a collaborative
activity with two partners. The profit of this collaborative project depends
on the effort each partner spends on the project and is given by α(x1 + x2 +
c1(x1x2)), where x1 is the amount of effort spent by partner 1 and x2 is
the amount of effort spent by partner 2. Assume that x1, x2 ∈ [0, α]. The
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value c1 ∈ [0, 2α ] measures how complementary the efforts of the partners
are. We assume the amount of cost each player will incur for this effort is
c2x
2
i , where c2 ∈ [32 , 2]. Both players choose their effort independently and
simultaneously, and both want to maximize their share of the profit of the
project which is equally divided between two players. So the payoff function
for partner i is
ui(x1, x2) = α(
x1 + x2
2
+ c1(
x1x2
2
))− c2x2i .
3 Main results
Nash equilibrium and the optimal amounts of effort
Considering x2 as average effort, mathematical expectation, of the player 2
based on the belief of player 1, we calculate the Nash equilibrium by finding
the best response function of each player
du1(x1, x2)
dx1
=
α
2
+
αc1
2
x2 − 2c2x1 = 0, (3.1)
d2u1(x1, x2)
dx21
= −2c2 < 0.
Hence Equation 3.1 and second derivative test specify the best response
function of player1 as x1 = B1(x2) =
α
4c2
(1+c1x2). Similarly the best response
function for player 2 is x2 = B2(x1) =
α
4c2
(1+ c1x1). A Nash equilibrium is a
pair (x∗1, x
∗
2) for which x
∗
1 is a best response to x
∗
2 and x
∗
2 is a best response
to x∗1 {
x∗1 = B1(x
∗
2) =
α
4c2
(1 + c1x
∗
2)
x∗2 = B2(x
∗
1) =
α
4c2
(1 + c1x
∗
1).
(3.2)
Solving these two equations, we find that x∗1 = x
∗
2 =
α
4c2−αc1
.
The payoff of each player in the Nash equilibrium is
ui(x
∗
1, x
∗
2) =
α2
2
(
6c2 − αc1
(4c2 − αc1)2
). (3.3)
We would like to calculate the optimal amount of effort as follows
u(x1, x2) = α(x1 + x2) + αc1(x1x2)− c2(x21 + x22),
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

∂u
∂x1
= α + αc1x2 − 2c2x1 = 0 =⇒ x1 = α(1+c1x2)2c2
∂u
∂x2
= α + αc1x1 − 2c2x2 = 0 =⇒ x2 = α(1+c1x1)2c2 .
(3.4)
By solving simultaneously the two equations x1 =
α(1+c1x2)
2c2
and x2 =
α(1+c1x1)
2c2
,
the result is x̂1 = x1 =
α
2c2 − αc1
and x̂2 = x2 =
α
2c2 − αc1
, clearly x∗1 < x̂1
,x∗2 < x̂2.
On the other hand, according to c1 ∈ [0, 2α ] and c2 ∈ [32 , 2], we have
D =
∣∣∣∣ −2c2 αc1αc1 −2c2
∣∣∣∣ = 4c22 − α2c21 > 0 , ∂2u∂x21 = −2c2 < 0. (3.5)
So based on the second derivative test, (x̂1, x̂2) is a relative maximal point
for u(x1, x2). With a simple calculation we have u(x̂1, x̂2) =
α2
2c2−αc1
. To
determine the absolute maximum of the optimal function, we must compare
values u(0, 0) = 0, u(α, α) = α2(2 − 2c2 + αc1) and u(x̂1, x̂2) = α22c2−αc1 .
Clearly u(0, 0) < u(α, α) and u(0, 0) < u(x̂1, x̂2). Considering l = 2c2 − αc1
the relation
α2
2c2 − αc1
≥ α2(2− 2c2 + αc1)
is equivalent to
1
l
≥ (2− l)
that is equivalent to
(l − 1)2 ≥ 0,
which is always true. So in this case u(x1, x2) has the absolute maximum in
(x̂1, x̂2) = (
α
2c2 − αc1
,
α
2c2 − αc1
).
Also
ui(x̂1, x̂2) =
α2
2(2c2 − αc1)
for i = 1, 2. (3.6)
As an infinitely repeated game wiht Crime-Trigger strategy, we consider
the Partnership model as a stage game in which each of players has the same
discount factor δ.
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Theorem.1 If δ ∈ [ (4c2−αc1)2
8c2(2c2−αc1)+(4c2−αc1)2
, 1) then the Trigger strategy is a
Subgame Perfect Equilibruim, SPE .
Proof. We consider
Stage game G:
Players: Two players i = 1, 2
Actions: ∀i xi ∈ [0, α]
Stage Game Payoff:
ui(x1, x2) = α(
x1 + x2
2
+ c1(
x1x2
2
))− c2x2i for all players i.
We consider the Trigger strategy as follows
∀i Si(ht) =


α
2c2−αc1
if t = 1
α
2c2−αc1
if (x̂1, x̂2), (x̂1, x̂2), (x̂1, x̂2), ...
α
4c2−αc1
if otherwise,
where ht is the history of game up to stage t. The concept of the above
strategy is that in the first step, the amount of the effort of each player is
α
2c2−αc1
. If up to step t−1, each player has selected the amount α
2c2−αc1
, then
the value α
2c2−αc1
is similarly chosen in step t, otherwise the value of effort
of the Nash equilibrium, α
4c2−αc1
, will be selected. We assume that the first
player adheres to the above strategy. In order to determine the adherence of
the second player to the above strategy , we will calculate her benefits from
violations and non-violations.
First we presume that both players adhere to the strategy. In this case
the sequence of the players’ selective combination will be as follows
(
α
2c2 − αc1
,
α
2c2 − αc1
), (
α
2c2 − αc1
,
α
2c2 − αc1
), ... .
According to the above sequence, the payoff sequence for the second player
is
α2
2(2c2 − αc1)
,
α2
2(2c2 − αc1)
, ... .
Therefore the present value of the payoffs of the second player is
α2
2(2c2 − αc1)
+ δ
α2
2(2c2 − αc1)
+ δ2
α2
2(2c2 − αc1)
+ ... =
α2
2(2c2 − αc1)
1
1− δ .
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Assuming that the first player adheres to the strategy, we would like to
calculate the optimal amount of the effort for the second player in case of
the violation, max u2(
α
2c2−αc1
, x2). In this case, we have
u2(
α
2c2 − αc1
, x2) =
α
2
(
α
2c2 − αc1
+ x2) +
αc1
2
(
αx2
2c2 − αc1
)− c2x22
du2
dx2
=
α
2
+
c1α
2
2(2c2 − αc1)
− 2c2x2 = 0 =⇒ x2 = α
2(2c2 − αc1)
,
d2u2
dx2
= −2c2 < 0.
Therefore x2 =
α
2(2c2−αc1)
is a relative maximum for u2(
α
2c2−αc1
, x2).
With a simple comparison between u2(
α
2c2−αc1
, 0) = α
2
2(2c2−αc1)
,
u2(
α
2c2 − αc1
, α) =
α2
2(2c2 − αc1)
+
c2α
2
(2c2 − αc1)
(1− (2c2 − αc1))
and
u2(
α
2c2 − αc1
,
α
2(2c2 − αc1)
) = (
α2(5c2 − 2αc1)
4(2c2 − αc1)2
) =
α2
2(2c2 − αc1)
+
c2α
2
4(2c2 − αc1)2
and considering
2c2 − αc1 ≥ 1,
it follows that x2 =
α
2(2c2−αc1)
is an absolute maximal for u2(
α
2c2−αc1
, x2).
The important point is
u2(x̂1,
α
2(2c2 − αc1)
) = u2(
α
2c2 − αc1
,
α
2(2c2 − αc1)
) = u2(x̂1, x̂2)+
c2α
2
4(2c2 − αc1)2
so u2(x̂1,
α
2(2c2−αc1)
) > u2(x̂1, x̂2) while
α
2(2c2−αc1)
< x̂2.
This means that the second player can achieve more payoff with an effort
less than the optimal amount of effort.
Let’s consider the selection sequence of the players in case of the second
player’s violation as follows
(
α
2c2 − αc1
,
α
2(2c2 − αc1)
), (
α
4c2 − αc1
,
α
4c2 − αc1
), (
α
4c2 − αc1
,
α
4c2 − αc1
), ... .
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So the sequence of the payoffs of player 2 is as follows
α2
2(2c2 − αc1)
+
c2α
2
4(2c2 − αc1)2
,
α2
2
(
6c2 − αc1
(4c2 − αc1)2
) ,
α2
2
(
6c2 − αc1
(4c2 − αc1)2
), ... .
Therefore in the violation, the present value of the payoffs of the second
player is
(
α2
2(2c2 − αc1)
+
c2α
2
4(2c2 − αc1)2
)+δ(
α2
2
(
6c2 − αc1
(4c2 − αc1)2
))+δ2(
α2
2
(
6c2 − αc1
(4c2 − αc1)2
))+...
= (
α2(5c2 − 2αc1)
4(2c2 − αc1)2
) + δ(
α2(6c2 − αc1)
2(4c2 − αc1)2(1− δ)
).
Since player 2 will not violate if her payoff is greater than or at least equal
to the non-violation, then we have to have
α2
2(2c2 − αc1)
1
(1− δ) ≥ (
α2(5c2 − 2αc1)
4(2c2 − αc1)2
) + δ(
α2(6c2 − αc1)
2(4c2 − αc1)2(1− δ)
).
It is easy to check that the above inequation is equivalent to
δ ≥ (4c2 − αc1)
2
(4c2 − αc1)2 + 8c2(2c2 − αc1)
.
With the same process for player 1, one can show that if δ ∈ [ (4c2−αc1)2
8c2(2c2−αc1)+(4c2−αc1)2
, 1)
then according to the Trigger strategy, the players will continue the cooper-
ation. Therefore the Trigger strategy is a SPE, that is, in each subgame the
players choose the cooperation, and no player intends to violate because his
payoffs reduce in comparison with cooperation. This completes the proof.
Theorem.2 In the partnership game for all δ ∈ (0, (4c2−αc1)2
8c2(2c2−αc1)+(4c2−αc1)2
)
we can define the Trigger strategy, in which each player’s level of effort, x, is
greater than x∗ and less than x̂.
Proof.We consider
Stage game G:
Players: Two players i = 1, 2
Actions: ∀i xi ∈ [0, α]
Stage Game Payoff:
ui(x1, x2) = α(
x1 + x2
2
+ c1(
x1x2
2
))− c2x2i for all player i.
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Also, we consider the Trigger strategy as follows
∀i Si(ht) =


x if t = 1
x if (x, x), (x, x), (x, x), ...
α
4c2−αc1
if otherwise,
where ht is the history of game up stage t. The concept of the above strategy
is that in the first step, the amount of the effort of each player is x. If up to
step t−1, each player has selected the amount x, then the value x is similarly
chosen in step t otherwise the value of effort of the Nash equilibrium, α
4c2−αc1
,
will be selected.
First we presume that both players adhere to the strategy in which case
the sequence of the players’ selective combination will be as follows
(x, x), (x, x), (x, x), ... .
According to the above sequence, the payoff sequence for player 2 is
u2(x, x), u2(x, x), u2(x, x), ... ,
where u2(x, x) = αx+ x
2(αc1
2
− c2).
Therefore the present value of the payoffs of player 2 in case of non-violation
is
(αx+ x2(
αc1
2
− c2)) + δ(αx+ x2(αc1
2
− c2)) + δ2(αx+ x2(αc1
2
− c2)) + ...
= (αx+ x2(
αc1
2
− c2))
1
1− δ .
Assuming that player 1 selects the level of effort x and player 2 intends to
violate from x, we calculate the optimal amount of effort, x∗, that maximizes
her payoff
u2(x, x∗) =
α
2
(x+ x∗) +
αc1
2
(xx∗)− c2x2∗
du2
dx∗
=
α
2
+
αc1
2
x− 2c2x∗ = 0 =⇒ x∗ =
α
4c2
(1 + c1x)
,
d2u2
dx2
∗
= −2c2 < 0.
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Therefore, according to the second derivative test, x∗ =
α
4c2
(1 + c1x) is a
relative maximal point for u2(x, x∗).
Also since c1 ∈ [0, 2α ] and c2 ∈ [32 , 2] it is easy to get x∗ = α4c2 (1+c1x) ≤
α
2
.
To determine the absolute maximum of u2(x, x∗), we need to compare the
values u2(x, 0) =
α
2
x, u2(x, α) =
α
2
(x+ α(1 + c1x)− 2c2α) and
u2(x, x∗) =
α
2
(x+
α
8c2
(1 + c1x)
2).
Clearly always u2(x, x∗) > u2(x, 0).
On the other hand,
u2(x, x∗) ≥ u2(x, α)
⇐⇒ α
2
(x+ α
8c2
(1 + c1x)
2) ≥ α
2
(x+ α(1 + c1x)− 2c2α)
⇐⇒ (1+c1x)
8c2
+ 2c2
(1+c1x)
≥ 1
⇐⇒ (4c2 − (1 + c1x))2 ≥ 0.
Because 4c2 − (1 + c1x))2 ≥ 0 is always true, then always
u2(x, x∗) ≥ u2(x, α).
Since players are always looking for less effort and more payoff, even if
u2(x, x∗) = u2(x, α) then player 2 always chooses less effort, x∗ =
α
4c2
(1+c1x).
In the above argument, x∗ is the optimal amount of effort for player 2 when
player 1 selects x.
This way, the selection sequence of the players in case of the second player’s
violation is
(x,
α
4c2
(1 + c1x)) , (
α
4c2 − αc1
,
α
4c2 − αc1
) , (
α
4c2 − αc1
,
α
4c2 − αc1
) , ... .
According to the above sequence, the sequence of the payoffs of player 2
is as follows
α
2
(x+
α
8c2
(1 + c1x)
2) ,
α2
2
(
6c2 − αc1
(4c2 − αc1)2
) ,
α2
2
(
6c2 − αc1
(4c2 − αc1)2
) , ... .
So in case of violation, the present value of the payoffs of the second
player is
(
α
2
(x+
α
8c2
(1 + c1x)
2)) + δ
α2
2
(
6c2 − αc1
(4c2 − αc1)2
) + δ2
α2
2
(
6c2 − αc1
(4c2 − αc1)2
) + ...
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= (
α
2
(x+
α
8c2
(1 + c1x)
2)) +
α2
2
(
6c2 − αc1
(4c2 − αc1)2
)(
δ
1− δ ).
Obviously, player 2 will adhere to Trigger strategy if
(αx+x2(
αc1
2
−c2)) 1
1− δ ≥ (
α
2
(x+
α
8c2
(1+c1x)
2))+
α2
2
(
6c2 − αc1
(4c2 − αc1)2
)(
δ
1− δ ).
By calculating, it is determined that the above inequality is equivalent to
Ax2 +Bx+ c ≥ 0 in which
A =
−1
16c2
((4c2 − αc1)2 − α2c21δ) = −(8c2(2c2 − αc1) + α2c21(1− δ)) < 0,
B =
α
8c2
((4c2 − αc1) + δ(4c2 + αc1)) > 0
C = − α
2
16c2
(δ(
32c22 − α2c21
(4c2 − αc1)2
) + 1) < 0.
Put p(x) = Ax2 + Bx + c, then this equation has
√
∆ = 2αc2δ
4c2−αc1
and its
roots are
x1 =
α
4c2 − αc1
, x2 =
α
4c2 − αc1
(4c2 − αc1)2 − δα2c21 + 32δc22
(4c2 − αc1)2 − δα2c21
.
In which x1 < x2 and x1 is the Nash equilibrium. Also,
δ <
(4c2−αc1)2
32c22−16αc1c2+α
2c21
⇐⇒ 32δc22
(4c2−αc1)2−δα2c21
< 2c2
2c2−αc1
⇐⇒ 1 + ( 32δc22
(4c2−αc1)2−δα2c21
) < 1 + ( 2c2
2c2−αc1
) = 4c2−αc1
2c2−αc1
⇐⇒ α
4c2−αc1
(4c2−αc1)2−δα2c21+32δc
2
2
(4c2−αc1)2−δα2c21
< α
2c2−αc1
So, according to the above calculations α
4c2−αc1
< x2 <
α
2c2−αc1
.
By specifying the sign p(x), it follows that p(x) is always nonnegative be-
tween two roots. On the other hand, if x1 = x2 = x then the calculations
indicate that ui(x, x) = αx + (x)
2(αc1
2
− c2) has two roots of 0 and 2α2c2−αc1
and it is maximal in α
2c2−αc1
. So, if α
4c2−αc1
< x < α
2c2−αc1
then ui(x, x) is
an increasing function. So, if players choose the level of more effort, their
payoffs will be greater. Therefore, the purpose of solving p(x) ≥ 0 is the
largest x for which p(x) ≥ 0. Hence the highest value of x is x2.
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Corollary.1. We have limδ→0 x2 = limδ→0
α
4c2−αc1
(4c2−αc1)2−δα2c21+32δc
2
2
(4c2−αc1)2−δα2c21
=
α
4c2−αc1
, lim
δ→
(4c2−αc1)
2
8c2(2c2−αc1)+(4c2−αc1)
2
x2 = lim
δ→
(4c2−αc1)
2
8c2(2c2−αc1)+(4c2−αc1)
2
α
4c2−αc1
(4c2−αc1)2−δα2c21+32δc
2
2
(4c2−αc1)2−δα2c21
= α
4c2−αc1
(1 +
32c22(
(4c2−αc1)
2
8c2(2c2−αc1)+(4c2−αc1)
2 )
(4c2−αc1)2−α2c21(
(4c2−αc1)
2
8c2(2c2−αc1)+(4c2−αc1)
2 )
) = α
4c2−αc1
(
64c22−16αc1c2
32c22−16αc1c2
)
= α
2c2−αc1
.
Then above calculations and Theorem 2 imply that x is the Nash equilibrium
level for each player whenever δ → 0, and each player will choose x̂ for the
level of effort if δ → (4c2−αc1)2
8c2(2c2−αc1)+(4c2−αc1)2
.
Corollary.2 In the partnership game, considering the Trigger strategy, for
each δ ∈ (0, 1) the level of effort in an infinitely repeated game is determined.
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